# Digital forensic investigation of Dropbox cloud storage service

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ABSTRACT: Nowadays, cloud storage services, a type of IaaS, are becoming a popular business paradigm for managing documents anytime and anywhere. It is possible for malicious users to abuse cloud storage services and the number of crime on them has increased rapidly. The investigation of these cloud storage services presents new challenges for the digital forensics community. Therefore procedures for forensic investigation of cloud storage services are necessary. This paper presents a process model for digital forensic investigation of cloud storage services and describes some important artifacts in PCs. Popular cloud storage service Dropbox is used as a case study; we document a series of digital forensic that they create experiments with the aim of providing forensic practitioners to undertake the cloud storage forensics.

Keywords: cloud storage, cyber crime, digital forensic investigation, Dropbox cloud storage service.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, cloud computing has become popular as a cost-effective and efficient computing paradigm. Cloud storage is a popular option for users to store their data and be able to access it via a range of internet connected devices. Cloud storage services, a type of IaaS, provide users with storage space. There are a range of cloud storage hosting providers, and many offer free cloud storage services, such as Dropbox, Microsoft® SkyDrive®, and Google Drive. ICTs, such as personal computers, laptops, smartphones and tablets, are fundamental to modern society and open the door to productivity. faster communication increased capabilities, and immeasurable convenience.

However, it also changes the way criminals conduct their activities, and vulnerabilities in ICT infrastructure are fertile grounds for criminal exploitation. With the development of the cloud storage, the number of crime on them has increased rapidly [1, 2]. Therefore cloud storage has been identified as an emerging challenge to digital forensic researchers and practitioners. This paper will discuss the need for cloud storage forensics and presents the procedures for forensic investigation of cloud storage services. It will also attempt to discover what evidence can be gathered from Dropbox, including evidence that is located on the computer(s) with Dropbox installed on them as well as evidence that can be gathered from the web portal. Organization of the paper is as follows: Dropbox cloud storage and research questions for digital forensics are described in Section 2. Cloud Storage Forensics Framework is outlined in Section 3. Dropbox forensic investigation is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 draws conclusions from the work conducted.

#### 2 DROPBOX CLOUD STORAGE FORENSIC AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

# 2.1 Dropbox cloud storage

Dropbox [3] is the most frequently used and popular cloud storage service used by over 50 million people in the world that allows for users to backup files to the internet and to share them with other people. It has applications that run on Windows®, Mac, Linux, iPhone, Android and Blackberry. The Dropbox application creates artifacts on a system that may provide pertinent information. The Dropbox servers store many useful logs in regards to account history and a user's file history. Obtaining these artifacts and log files could provide an investigator with valuable evidence. Digital Forensics is a branch of forensic science that is used to encompassing the recovery and investigation of data in digital devices. Conventional digital forensic methods are insufficient for investigating cloud storage [4].

- 2.2 Research questions for Dropbox Forensic
  - What artifacts are created during the Dropbox installation process?
  - What artifacts are left behind after Dropbox is uninstalled?
  - What artifacts are created in VM hard drives, database files and log files of Web Browsers during the accessing VMs?
  - What artifacts are left behind in VM hard drives and Web Browsers after uploading and downloading files?
  - What artifacts are left behind after Anti-Forensic software used?

# **3 FORENSIC FRAMEWORK**

Our cloud storage forensic framework is based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology [5]. The framework is iterative, and a practitioner can start one or more iterative processes, while the overall investigation progresses. Our cloud storage forensic framework (Fig 1) comprises five phases; preparation, preservation, collection, examination and analysis, and documentation and presentation.




Figure 1. Cloud storage forensic framework

*Preparation*: This phase is concerned with preparation of tools, techniques, training, equipment acquisition, search warrants and monitoring authorisation and management support.

*Preservation*: This phase is concerned with isolation, securing and preserving the state of physical and digital evidence.

*Collection*: This phase is concerned with recording the physical scene and duplicating digital evidence using standardized and accepted procedures.

*Examination and analysis*: This phase is concerned with the examination and analysis of digital evidence. Examination is an in-depth systematic search of evidence relating to the suspected crime and focuses on identifying and locating potential evidence. Analysis determines importance and probative value to the case of the examined product.

*Documentation and Presentation*: This phase is concerned with completely and accurately reporting steps of findings and the results of the analysis of the digital evidence examination. Documentation is an ongoing process throughout the examination.

### 4 FORENSIC INVESTIGATION

#### 4.1 Preparation Phase

To gather the artifacts in relation to the use of Dropbox created in Pcs, we created 18 VMs as shown in Fig 2. We examine and analyze a variety of circumstances of user accessing Dropbox by Windows client software and different Web browsers.




Figure 2. VMs creation for experiment

Testing environment and summary configurations of VMs are described in Table 1 and 2.

Table 1. Testing Environment

Tuble 1. Testil		
Environment	System Specification	
Heats	Intel <sup>®</sup> Core <sup>™</sup> i7- 2600 CPU @ 3.40GHz,	
Hosts	4GB RAM, 1TB HD, 1Gigabit Ethernet	
VMs	1024MB RAM, 50GB, HardDisk (SCSI)	
C. C.	VMware®Workstation 9.0, Windows 7,	
Software	CCleaner 4.19, Dropbox Client 2.10.30	
Web	Internet Explorer 9, Mozilla FireFox 33.0,	
Browsers	Google Chrome 38.0	
EDRM File	consists of 381 files covering 200 file	
Format	formats [6]. Key files: AFTER.doc,	
Dataset	LEAR.pdf, piñata.png, Getting Started.pdf	

Table 2. Summary Configuration of VMs

VMs	Software Components	
3 Clean VMs	Win 8, Browsers (IE,FF,GC)	
3 Install/Upload VMs	Win 8, Browsers(IE,FF,GC),	
3 Uninstall VMs	Dataset, Dropbox client S/W	
3 Access VMs	Win 8, Browsers (IE,FF,GC),	
3 Up/Download VMs	Data Set	
3 Anti-Forensic VMs	Win 8, Browsers (IE,FF,GC),	
5 Anti-Forensic VMs	Dataset, CClearner	

4.2 *Preservation phase* 

A digital forensic investigation is the ability to conduct analysis on a forensic copy, rather than interacting with or altering the original source. At the preservation stage, the physical items are examined and details documented, such as hard drive manufacturer, serial numbers, model numbers, and other information. Data is copied in a forensic manner, using write-protection and creating a bitfor-bit copy, verified with an MD5 and/or SHA hash algorithm.

#### 4.3 Collection phase

Secure collection of evidence is important to guarantee the evidential integrity and security of information. In order to do analysis, we collect the digital evidence by using disk imaging tool. In this research, a forensic copy of virtual hard drive and each memory file are created by using AccessData FTK Imager [8]. MD5 hash value of each file is calculated and verified with each forensic copy.

### 4.4 Examination and analysis phase

In this phase, forensic copies of the VM hard drives, memory captures were examined and analyzed by using forensic tools [8]. Dropbox cloud storage is a Web-based service and Internet browsing history is important for forensics investigation. In this research, we examined and analyzed the artifacts of Windows client software and Web browsers stored in PCs. We installed the client dropbox software and Dataset used for testing on "Install/Upload VMs" then examined and analyzed. The artifacts found in that VMs are listed in Table 3.

Table 3. Important paths	s of Dropbox client software
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Folder/File	Paths		
Installe Folder	"%AppData%\Dropbox		
Sync Folder	C:\Users\ <username>\Dropbox</username>		
Default file	Getting Started.pdf .dropbox (DROPBOX File)		
Link Files	C:\Users\ <username>\Desktop\Dropbox.lnk C:\Users\<username>\Links\Dropbox.lnk</username></username>		
Executable & libraries	C:\Users\ <username>\AppData\Roaming\ Dropbox\bin</username>		
Prefetch Files	C:\Windows\Prefetch\DROPBOX N.N.NN.EXE-NNNNNNN.pf C:\Windows\Prefetch\DROPBOX N.N.NN.EXE-NNNNNNN.pf		
Database Files	<pre>%AppData%\Dropbox\host.dbx, host.db, unlink.db %AppData%\Dropbox\instance1\aggregation. dbx, config.dbx, photo.dbx, unlink.db deleted.dbx, sigstore.dbx, filecache.dbx, notifications.dbx,</pre>		

To examine the result of user uninstalling the client software, we created Uninstall VMs and did the experiment. We found that Dropbox sync folder and file contents remained on the hard drive and was not affected. Only host.dbx file remain in "%AppData%\Dropbox" and other files are removed. All database files are removed form "%AppData%\Dropbox\instance1\".

The majority of Dropbox's configuration and user info are stored in SQLite database files. Dropbox® Decryptor from Magnet Forensics Tools [9] and SQLite DB Browser [10] are used to decrypt the Dropbox encrypted SQLite databases and to view the contents of the DB file. The important artifacts of Dropbox databases are shown in Table 4. Table 4. Important artifacts of Dropbox databases

config.dbx		
Host_id	Signature value of the Host's ID	
Email	DropBox user's email	
Displayname	PC Display Name	
Userdiaplayname	Dropbox User's name	
Dropbox_path	Location of Dropbox User folder	
filecache.dbx (file	_journal)	
id	File's ID assign by DropBox	
Server_path	The path of the stored file	
Local_filename	The name of the stored file	
Local_size	The size of the stored file	
Local_mtime	File modification time(UNIX Time)	
Local_ctime	File creation time (UNIX Time)	
User_id	Dropbox User ID	
sigstore.dbx		
hash	The hash value of the stored file	
size	The size of the stored file	
deleted.dbx (File Table)		
cache_path	Path of cache file	
origin_path	Path of deleted filename in sync folder	
Date_added	Deleted date	
Size	The size of the stored file	
mtime	modification time	

The information contain in config.dbx, filecache.dbx, sigstore.dbx and delete.dbx are shown in Fig 3, 4, 5 and 6.

9	host_id	0f7ac2592db162b8a23a5d712180b834	
10	root_ns	746166755	
11	email	cloudstorageforensic2014@gmail.com	
12	userdisplayname	cloudstorage forensic	
13	displayname	WIN-C9SPDVFUBJN	
14	dropbox_path	C:\Users\asustek\Dropbox	
Sigure 3 config dbx			

Figure 3. config.dbx

Tab	le:	file_journal		•	~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~		New Reco	rd Delete Reco
	id	server_path	parent_path	ending	local_sjid	local_filename	local_blocklist	local_size
	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter
1	1	746166755:/gett	74616675		5041134051	Getting Started	pBTCVnmA6QJ	249159
2	2	746166755:/leaf	74616675		687940934115	leaf_BG.JPG	23gVmemScTL	3781

#### Figure 4. filecache.dbx

Tab	Table: 🔲 sigstore 🔻 😥						
	hash	sig	size				
	Filter	Filter	Filter				
1	pBTCVnmA6QJnyEaeJHS_Gd4-FqssCIN_XbMVhFkkRl4	(BLOB)	249159				
2	23gVmemScTLKxF2uikv508p4KbHvfIS0nGhf5K0HZ4w	(BLOB)	3781				

Figure 5. sigstore.dbx

	New	Record Delete R	ecord
date_added	origin_ns	size	
Filter	Filter	Filter	Filt
2014-11-24	746166755	2561	141
2014-11-24	746166755	39193	141
2014-11-24	746166755	290205	141
	Filter 2014-11-24 2014-11-24	date_added         origin_ns           Filter         Filter           2014-11-24         746166755           2014-11-24         746166755	Filter         Filter         Filter           2014-11-24         746166755         2561           2014-11-24         746166755         39193

Figure 6. deleted.dbx

To view the user names and passwords stored by Web browsers (Fig. 7), we used PasswordFox, password recovery tool [11].

<b>38</b>		Webl	BrowserPassView
File Edit View Options Help			
🔜 🗗 🖻 🖆 🖏 📲			
URL 🗠	Web Bro	User Name	Password
https://www.dropbox.com	Firefox 32+	cstorageforensics2014@gmail.com	cstorageforensics
Nttps://www.dropbox.com/login	Chrome	cstorageforensics2014@gmail.com	cstorageforensics

Figure 7. User name and password

1	Table 5. Important files and paths of Web Browsers
	Mozilla Firefox 33.0.2

NIOZINA FIFEIOX 55.0.2				
1				
ocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\profile\xxx				
lefault\cache2\entries				
ppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\profile\				
xx.default\places.sqlite				
ppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\profile\				
xx.default\formhistory.sqlite				
ppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\profile\				
xx.default\cookies.sqlite				
ppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\profile\				
xx.default\ permissions.sqlite				
384				
ocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\				
nporaryInternet Files\Low				
ocalAppData%\Microsoft\				
rnet Explorer				
ocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\				
cies				
e 38.0.2125.111 m				
ocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\				
data\default\cache				
ocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\				
data\default\history				
ocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\				

We examined and analyzed the registry files of all VMS, created for doing experiment, using Windows Registry data extraction and correlation tool, RegRipper [12]. There were references to the Dropbox URL, Dropbox Software files and folders, Dropbox default files and EDRM File Format Dataset test files in Install/Upload VMs, Access VMs and Download VMs but not in Clean VMs. Dropbox username is not provided in registry file. NTUSER.dat file is a registry file which contains a unique documents folder, custom settings, desktop properties and browsing history. Sample RegRipper output is listed in Fig 8.

RecentDocs - recentdocs
\*\*All values printed in MRUList\MRUListEx order.
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs
LastWrite Time Tue Nov 25 02:24:54 2014 (UTC)
27 = Dropbox
10 = LEAR.PDF
4 = leaf\_BG.JPG
18 = User Accounts and Family Safety
21 = instance1
26 = deleted.dbx

Analysis of the 3 anti-forensic VMs, we observed that the references to the file names were removed when all options were used for CCleaner [7].

# 4.5 Documentation and presentation phase

According to the experiment, we found that a variety of data remnants were located when user used Dropbox to access and store data. The important files, paths, artifacts of Dropbox cloud storage service are documented as shown in above tables. This information enables a practitioner to conduct forensic analysis and will assist to determine if Dropbox client software has been used.

# 5 CONCLUSION

Cloud storage services are becoming more prevalent, and not just for businesses - end- and home-users are taking advantage of opportunities to automate backups, make files available offline or from any computer, share files and photos, and so on. It is possible for malicious users to abuse cloud storage services and the number of crime on them has increased rapidly. In this paper, cloud storage forensic framework is presented and popular cloud storage service Dropbox is used as a case study. We conducted the experiment on Dropbox cloud storage and highlighted a lot of useful information that can be found by analyzing artifacts left by Cloud Storage This methodology is helpful in the clients. investigation of cloud storage services.

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- [10] SQLiteDB Browser: http://sqlitebrowser.org
- [11] Password Recovery: http://www.nirsoft.net
- [12] RegRipper: http://regripper.wordpress.com
- https://my.pcloud.com/#page=register&invite=xlyLZuuCxgy

Figure 8. Sample RegRipper output of NTUSER.DAT

https://my.pcloud.com/#page=register&invite=avyLZx5bSLV