

## **The Important Role of Pro-reformed Stakeholders during Transitional Period in Indonesia and Myanmar**

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### **Abstract**

Among three stages of democratization: Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation, this paper focus on the interval period – Transition – of it in Indonesia and Myanmar. At this juncture, the respective new civilian governments continued to accelerate the existing democratic practices and substantial reforms. The accomplishment of transition and to reach the final stage of consolidation was not an easy task for stakeholders – government, military and civil society organizations (CSOs) – as they are inevitable to face challenges when conducting those important reforms. Here, the argument is that the clear attitudes and endeavors of pro-reformed stakeholders in the elected governments, military and CSOs are important to accomplish the transition. Therefore, this paper emphasized to answer the question of how the roles of Indonesian and Myanmar's stakeholders have been during the interval period of democratization.

**Keywords:** Transition, Pro-reformed stakeholders, Civilian government, Military, CSOs

### **I. Introduction**

After the 2001 leadership change in Indonesia and the 2015 general elections in Myanmar, the new civilian governments headed the transitional periods through implementing various reforms initiated by the previous governments. In Indonesia; for instance, the government led by President Megawati Sukarnoputri continued to implement the constitutional reforms, combating anti-corruption, and decentralization in governance, all of which were already initiated by the previous Habibie and Wahid's governments. In Myanmar, the NLD government under the guidance of State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has persistently attempted to bring peace in the ethnic areas, organized free and fair by-elections, and maintained freedom of expression and media freedom, which had been initiated by the former President U Thein Sein's government. Moreover, the Indonesian and Myanmar's CSOs run parallel to the respective governments in the endeavors of democratic transitions.

Generally, this transitional period is the interval between the period of liberalization and consolidation. During this interval period, the elected government continues to accelerate the existing democratic practices and substantial reforms. Indeed, the process of transition can be fully accomplished only when there is no power sharing with unelected bodies in executive, legislative and judicial organs. In this way, the government can adopt its own policies freely (Bhakti 2004: 200).

Larry Diamond has stated that the phase of full-fledge liberal democracy can be reached when there was 'no reserved power for those who are not responsible to the voters' (Haynes 2003: 59). It means if the political system is totally transformed to the stage of full-fledged democracy, the security and defence sectors would be placed under the control of civilian government. Besides, the legislative body would have full authority to check and oversee the operations and budget of defence institutions. (Egretreau 2017: 2) It is noteworthy that limiting or removing the space of unelected person from legislative organ is the major challenges for those countries which had been under the military control in the past. The problem is how to deal with the military men to reduce their role in politics, to agree the principle of civilian

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supremacy in security matters and how to build mutual trust between civilian and military personnel. Under such a challenging situation, the clear attitudes and endeavors of pro-reformed stakeholders in the elected governments, military and CSOs are important to accomplish the transition. Therefore, it remains to be answered the question of how have been the roles of Indonesian and Myanmar's stakeholders during the interval period of democratization.

On the other hand, in order to accomplish the transitional phase, the elected government itself has a strong desire to flourish the liberal practices, such as equally respect to both political rights and civil liberties. Political rights mean free and fair elections, and civil liberties include freedom of expression, assembly and association and wide representation in decision making. If the government is increasingly in favor of political rights than the civil liberties, it can be regarded as the illiberal practices (Haynes 2003: 36). Based on the above mentioned concept, this section will focus on the important reforms, civil liberties and other related events that contribute to the accomplishment of transitional period as well as the roles of pro-reformed stakeholders in these junctures.

Interestingly, the transitional phases of Indonesia and Myanmar were headed by the two female leaders: Megawati Sukarnoputri; and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. They are the daughters of founding fathers of respective countries. And both have a similar experience in resisting the authoritarian governments. While leading the opposition parties, they encountered the governments' repression on their loyal supporters and the challenges to their parties' survival.

Besides, they faced many challenges to become a president or a de facto leader of the government. In Indonesia, a debate on whether a woman should take the highest position of Islam majority country had a great impact on the upcoming leadership role of Megawati in 1998. In the 1999 election, she received the majority votes of 35.7 million, but she was selected as Vice-president by MPR because the election result of her party PDI-P (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) did not reach the threshold of fifty percent (Doorn-Harder 2002: 165-172). Other challenging factors included 'a non-military leader, and a symbolic representative of her father' (Coles 2018: 67). She also faced her rivals' attempts to change the Article 8 of 1945 Constitution. According to this Article, if President Wahid was permanently in a disabling condition during his term of office, the Vice-president Megawati would take the President's responsibility automatically. The claim for amendment intended to deter Megawati to become a President, but it failed finally. In July 2001, most of the religious leaders accepted her as the president of the state (Doorn-Harder 2002: 165).

In Myanmar, the NLD party won the landslide victory in 2015 election, but its party leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, missed the presidency because she was inconsistent with the president's qualifications stipulated in the 2008 Constitution. In spite of missing the presidency, she attained a powerful position than the president. After approving the State Counsellor Bill in April 2016, she took a new position of state counsellor. Apart from security and defence sectors, the executive, legislature and other important matters such as democracy affairs, the economy, federalism and the peace process were operating under her supervision (Sein & Farrelly 2016: 27). Whatever huge challenges they faced, these two female leaders occupied the highest position of the state at last as they expected.

## **II. Reforms in Indonesia and Myanmar during Transitional Period**

Megawati was sworn in as a new president in July 2001. Before then, numerous liberalized activities had been already taken place; for example, granting amnesty to political prisoners, reducing the limitations on political parties and organizations, lifting censorship in media, and gradually reducing the role of military in legislative organs. Megawati as the

president, made some adjustments in reform measures initiated by the previous governments. Most of the Indonesians had special attention on how she steered the current reforms. Indeed, her followers and loyal supporters had high expectation on her leading role. During her presidency, the fourth constitutional amendment which provided for the direct presidential election and unconditionally withdrawal of unelected bodies from the parliament in 2004 and the formation of new anti-corruption organ, called KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) were taken into account as the successful missions (Aspinall 2010: 119-126).

However, Megawati could not escape from the criticism of her people. Most of criticisms on her administration were concerned with the lack of well-prepared for future plans. At the time of holding special session in parliament, which aimed to impeach the incumbent President Wahid, most of the Indonesia people already expected that sooner or later Megawati would become the fifth president. Thus, Megawati and her advisers had enough time for months to draw a roadmap, but they could only present a few proposals. Shari & Clifford (2001: 40), reporters of *Business Week*, stated in their article of 'Short Honeymoon' that by comparing the Philippines President Gloria M. Arroyo who had already had a clear agenda and economic policy at the time of taking office, but the policies of Indonesia's new cabinet was unsure at the beginning of new administration.

Moreover, she assigned the important duty – for example, formulating the government's policy – to her close military personnel, rather than initiating on her own as a responsible person. Besides, the guidelines or instructions for her cabinet members were very general and not specific in actions. According to personality and her governance style, she was presumed as an ineffective reforming president. Most critics worried about her conservative approach in governance. The former president Wahid appointed the reform-minded persons in the crucial positions of his cabinet. But Megawati was more favor to cooperate with the military men and former New Order members who were reluctant to implement the reform measures. Moreover, she neglected the voices of her party's members and constituents regarding the appointment of former New Order loyalists to serve as the governors in some provinces (Aspinall 2010: 127).

On the other hand, while at the crossroads in democratic transition, the government had faced the 2002 terrorist attacks in Bali. After that event, Indonesia became one of the partners of US-led global war on terrorism. Thus, security matter became priority issue, and it gave the way for military to take the leading role in politics again. With this complex security issues, the domestic political situation was more liable turning back to the former situation. There was no guarantee for Indonesian democratic transition to become consolidation at that time. Suharko (2003: 204-206) argued that if the civilian politicians were reluctant to bring about democratic consolidation at the crossroads of transition, Indonesia would be under the control of military rule again.

Due to the impact of ineffective reform measures, lack of vision, and failure to fulfill the expectation of her people, Megawati inevitably faced gradual losing of her popularity, even still in office. As a result, her party was defeated by the Democratic Party in the 2004 elections. But the opposing view was that her government implemented the reform process very cautiously and practically (Indonesia Country Profile 2006: 17). In fact, rather than widening the scope of reforms, her government had emphasized on the important measures such as constitutional and military reforms that were crucial for successfully ending of transitional phase in 2004 (Abdulbaki 2008: 159).

In the case of Myanmar, the public expectations were also high upon the new government for continuing the reform measures effectively. Accordingly, the NLD government has much attention to end the arm-conflicts in ethnic areas and to bring peace throughout the whole country. In her first speech after the 2015 election, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has stated

that “the peace process is the first thing the new government will work on” (Taylor 2016: 1). Thus, the peace process was a top priority to build the national reconciliation. As the initial step taken by a new government, its cabinet members were assigned to prepare the 100-day plans for their respective ministries (Thawngmung & Robinson 2017: 237).

In July 2017, the government announced a twelve-point economic policy agenda as the first step of economic reforms. Mainly, it aimed to develop ‘an economic framework that supports national reconciliation’ (*Economic Policy of the Union of Myanmar* 2016: 1). Moreover, Myanmar Investment Promotion Plan also encouraged to develop responsible investments for sustainable and all-round development and increased equality (Pedersen 2019: 227). The government enforced the anti-corruption rules for officials and lawmakers, increased agricultural loans to farmers and emphasized on the affairs of workers living in abroad (Thawngmung & Robinson 2017: 238). In fact, new agendas and laws introduced by the new government intended the existing reforms to be effective.

However, the government faced criticism about its delay for policy formulation and for lacking clear vision and strategies for actions. Soon after taking the power the government failed to present a concrete policy for the economic sector. When presenting their action plans for the hundred days and the long-awaited economic policy, they had no specific strategies and priority areas (Min 2018: 221). Besides, the media also highlighted the weakening of civil liberties under the NLD government. Even though civilians, journalists and political activists were sued by the military for defamation, the government did not make any comment on trials, and sometime, it also did the same thing (Kumbun 2019: para. 10). Furthermore, the government has reluctant to share information with the media and to amend the section 66 (d) of 2013 Telecommunications Law, which has mainly blocked the freedom of expression (Cook 2017: 2).

Researchers suggested that while giving priority to the peace process, the government should not neglect the urgent need of economic reforms (Min 2018: 238). This is because the peace process will take a long time and power-sharing arrangements among ethnic groups had never been adequately settled (Wilson 2017: para. 6). Thus, they suggested that the politics and economic reforms should be done simultaneously. All these assessments signified a gap between the government responses and the public’s high expectation on reforms.

### **III. The Roles of Stakeholders in Reforms during Transitional Period of Indonesia**

#### **3.1 Constitutional Reforms**

During the third amendment discussions in 2001, there was civil society movement on the emergence of totally new constitution than amending it. They started to advocate with the members of parliament to draw a new one but the MPR decided to amend the original (Indrayana 2008: 184–185). CSOs had cooperated with the political parties, especially Golkar and National Awakening Party (PKB), in order to submit the proposals to MPR annual sessions for constitutional amendment. They involved in the Constitutional Commission or National Committee organized by the political parties, through which they could present their opinion by deliberating with the legislators, experts and selected members from the various provinces. According to the consequences of third amendment, the MPR had no longer to elect the president and the vice-president either thanks to the adoption of a direct presidential election. Moreover, a new council, called Regional Representative’s Council, (DPD) was established, and its elected members from each province became ‘senators’ in the parliament (Indrayana 2008: 196-201).

At the time of discussion for fourth amendment in 2002, there was a contradict visions on the amendment process. Coalition for a New Constitution group which consisted of the NGO activists and constitutional experts suggested the formation of new independent body, like a Constitutional Commission (Indrayana 2008: 207). The Coalition wanted to change the constitution to be 'more democratic, modern, comprehensive and responsive to any new demands'. The members of Coalition believed that if they failed to amend the constitution, it would lead to the emergence of new authoritarian government in the future (Sarsito 2007: 11).

On the other hand, the Constitutional Scientific Analysis Forum and the Armed Forces Veterans Association wanted to stop the amendment of 1945 Constitution because they worried that the new additional amendments would convert the original principle of the constitution such as unitary state and unicameral system (Indrayana 2008: 208). President Megawati herself was reluctant to change the constitution because it was written by her father, President Sukarno in 1945. But as President, she allowed to precede the amendment. Within her party, PDI-P, there was a group which against the constitutional reforms.

Under the complex situation based on contradict visions, the MPR guaranteed that there were no changes in the preamble, and thus, the Pancasila was the only state ideology. During the preparation for the fourth amendment, the MPR had taken into consider the suggestions provided by the various CSOs such as NGOs, research institutes and other professional organizations (Indrayana 2008: 210-230). As the remarkable achievements resulting from the fourth amendment, the reserved seats for military men and other appointed members were no longer exist in MPR after the 2004 general elections. Besides, rather the parliamentary elections, Indonesians would have a chance to elect their president directly since 2004.

### **3.2 Military Reforms**

The implementation of military reform in Indonesia had successfully accomplished the transitional period and stepped into the next phase of democratic consolidation (Widjajanto 2007: 20). Since 1996, the Indonesian people wanted the armed forces to withdraw from politics and urged to initiate the military reform (Slamet 2008: 11). In fact, the Indonesian armed forces were under high pressure to adopt reform agendas which made them to be under civilian control and to stop their operating business for financial interests (Wardoyo 2017: 325). Various CSOs, together with other several groups from university students, professional associations, public figures and victims of human rights abuse had strongly against the dual function of armed forces and urged to reorganize the army and police separately (Slamet 2008: 16). As the entities of CSOs, think tanks, motivator groups and pressure groups were the main vehicles to advocate the military reforms. Think tanks which composed of academics, policy makers and retired officers occasionally discussed for developing new policy, and preparing academic papers to share information and opinions among them (Al-Ahlaq 2007: 152).

The motivator groups, in which scholars and student activists were the main players, encouraged to increase the public awareness on the military reforms though they had no influential power in policy making. The pressure groups which composed of ordinary peoples in society, sufferers of military violence and law firms criticized the weak point of government's implementations in the reform process. All these groups aimed to provide several recommendations for new policy and also urged to remove outdated policies that were inconsistent with the democratic practices. Their first and foremost recommendation was to introduce 'civilian supremacy' in state's security and defence sectors (Al-Ahlaq 2007: 153-154).

In fact, the military reform was firstly introduced by TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) itself rather than the public initiatives (Widjajanto 2007: 24). Just soon after the fall of Suharto regime, General Wiranto, Commander of armed forces, declared a new doctrine called 'New

Paradigm' in 1998. After making several consultations, the reform-minded officers led by Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had adopted this doctrine to be adaptable with the changing situation of Indonesian society. The main focus of new paradigm was shifting the role of TNI from internal security to external defense. Thus, as a separate organ, the police forces had to take responsibility of internal security and would have a direct contact to the president (Rabasa & Haseman 2002a: 25–26). Moreover, the TNI had dissolved its dual function, reduced its role in the legislature gradually, and given a promise to be impartial in politics (Widjajanto 2007: 24).

The key success of military reform from 1998 to 2000 was the result of collaboration between military reformers and outsiders such as CSOs, the parliament and government agencies. Most of the military reformers were 'academically inclined officers' (Rabasa & Haseman 2002a: 30). In Indonesia, the first batch of defense studies were mostly consisted of the retired military officers but in the second and third batches, the inclusion of civilian scholars in defense studies, associated with the military men, had gradually increased. Mainly, the officers of the second batch had well motivated to develop the reform within the army.

Moreover, Juwono Shdarsono, who was serving as the first civilian Minister of Defense during the Wahid presidency, had close ties with the civilian scholars from third batch and welcomed their suggestions for future military doctrines. In fact, some civilian scholars had already possessed theoretical and practical knowledge about a new agenda for military reform. Besides, they had CSOs background, that convenient to build a network with the other CSOs and also communicated with the military officers as well as the legislators. With these widespread connections, the civilian scholars could participate in parliament meetings for policy formulation (Wardoyo 2017: 326–327).

On the other hand, military hardliners had made against the civilian control upon the security sector since the implementation of reform (Greenlees 2011: 8). They had no desire to sacrifice their previous political power, assuming that they were also representing civil society (Slamet 2008: 21). During Megawati administration, those hardliners were appointed as the senior military officers. As a result, it had a negative impact on the process of military reforms (Greenlees 2011: 11). On the other side, appointing those officers in the cabinet could create a good relationship with Megawati, and thus it was effective in handling both internal and external threats, especially secession movements in Aceh and Papua (Rabasa & Haseman 2002b: 46). Those military men were reluctant to cooperate with the civilians in drawing future plan of reform process because they assumed that those civilians had no experience in state security and defence matters (Slamet 2008: 22).

While the topic of 'war on terror' became popular in world politics, the international attentions had changed from military reform to the build-up of military capability in Indonesia. Under this situation, CSOs highlighted that the changing perception would hamper the ongoing process of democratization and give a chance for Indonesian army to be taken the leading role of the state again (Slamet 2008: 19). Greenlees (2011: 18) concluded that the military was reluctant to run under the supervision of civilian leaders as long as it could not bring about peace in Aceh. Thus, in order to reduce the role of army in politics, it should be emphasized on building permanent stability in domestic.

Al-Ahlaq (2007: 152–162) discussed that at the time of regime change in 1998, CSOs aimed to happen dramatic changes in politics and speed up the democratic transition. Thus, they urged the military institutions 'Return back to barracks', 'demilitarization', or 'the State without the Army'. However, they had no rational solution for security affairs like how to change the TNI, Police force and State Intelligence Agency to be professional and how to modernize the defence strategy and systems. He suggested that CSOs need to approach the real

situation by focusing on cases and issues rather than constructing one-sided analysis on defence and security law and policy.

#### **IV. The Roles of Stakeholders in Reforms during Transitional Period of Myanmar**

##### **4.1 Promises for Constitutional Amendments**

The topic of constitutional amendment became the ultimate goal of political parties since 2010 election campaigns. The NLD party had pressured on the USDP government to change the constitution. According to Nte (2016: 389–390), Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had approached with three strategies to bring about the amendment. As the first strategy, by utilizing its influential power the NLD party motivated to initiate the amendment process. Along with such motivation, the representatives from the USDP party proposed to organize a review committee. Unfortunately, it did not functioning because most of the recommendations from the opposition and ethnic groups were rejected by the military personnel in the parliament. The NLD party applied its second strategy of political dialogue with main actors, such as President U Thein Sein, Lower House Speaker U Shwe Mann and a commander – in – chief army, Senior General Min Aung Hling but there was no response from the president and the speaker. Finally, after realizing only a slim chance for change, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi turned to cooperate with the civil society.

In 2014, the NLD intensified its nationwide campaigns by working together with the 88 Generation–led Peace and Open Society and the other CSOs. During these constitutional campaigns, they collected five million signatures. Moreover, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Min Ko Naing and other NLD party members shared their views on the constitution in the public discussions. However, during the USDP administration, the NLD holding only six per cent of the total seats of the first parliament (2011-2016) could not remove the constitutional blockage relating to the veto powers enjoyed by the military personnel in all legislatures (Kyaw 2018: paras. 6, 13).

Even after the NLD party came into power in March 2016, it was still losing the way for amendment because of different perceptions. The NLD responsible persons reiterated their commitment to change the constitution even they had been encountered so many challenges (Han 2017: para. 7). At the occasion of 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Independence Day in January 2018, the former President U Htin Kyaw expressed his government's ambition to create a Constitution that would be consistent with the democratic standards (Aung 2018: para. 1). On the other hand, the military personnel have reiterated that Myanmar is still a 'young democracy', and stability and reconciliation are the important matters at the present time of democratic transition (Selth 2015: 4). Therefore, many observers on Myanmar politics have stated that the military personnel are unwilling to withdraw from politics as long as there is no peace and stability within a country. As a consequence, it blocked the way for civilian supremacy in security sector at present.

The government and parliament could not make so far any progress in this constitutional reform. Under this deadlock situation, the pressure for constitutional reform continued to mount erupted by several CSOs. As they believed that the constitutional amendment is prerequisite for nation building, CSOs leaders urged to initiate the amendment at the first national forum of CSOs held in Naypyidaw in 2017. U Ra Kham, a representative of Chin State, requested all CSOs participants at the forum that "Neither the government nor parliament have taken action to change the constitution. So, let's change the constitution and build a federal state with the strength of CSOs" (Zaw 2017: para. 12).

CSOs welcomed the formation of a Constitutional Amendment Committee established in February 2019 in the hope of guaranteeing civil liberties and assisting the democratic

transition (Free Expression Myanmar 2019: para. 1). This occasion was mostly recognized as the first attempt of government through the channel of parliament. But, after four years in power, it gives rise suspicion upon whether the NLD government would fulfill its commitment during the rest of its administration.

#### **4.2 Prospect for Military Reforms**

The 2008 constitution has created the army to become an ‘autonomous institution’ excluding the civilian control. Consequently, the army could adopt its own strategies and operations without any interference by the civilian government. But, since 2011 the Tatmadaw has made some relaxations in its mandate. For instance, the annual defence budgets were documented in parliamentary record and announced publicly. Besides, the Tatmadaw has stayed away from ‘day-to-day politics’ (Selth, 2015: 2-3). All these developments can be assumed as positive change, but it seems unlikely to proceed the additional step of military reform.

Generally, the main ambition of military reform is to relinquish veto power by military personnel in parliament, to withdraw from all legislative bodies unconditionally and to introduce the civilian supremacy in security sector. In July 2019, the NLD government proposed the agenda for constitutional amendment in which some recommendations are related to ‘reducing the role of military and its Commander – in – Chief in politics and decentralization’. The Union Parliament approved the government’s recommendations in August (Aung 2019: paras. 1-5). But, at the time of writing, those recommendations were failed to materialize due to the lack of military’s approval.

In fact, it might have so many factors to delay the military reform. But, among them, some possible causes are lack of mutual cooperation between the Tatmadaw and the NLD government, and misunderstanding on perception of security matters between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed groups. Since the time of emerging civilian administration, the heads of government and the Tatmadaw have tried to maintain their relationship to be stable through avoiding any interference in the executive matters by the Tatmadaw and refraining from any confrontation with military by the government (Sein & Farrelly 2016: 30). As a result, there was no confrontation as well as no cooperation. Besides, there has been a controversial issue on a ‘federal union army’ and a ‘single army’ between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed groups. The latter proposed to organize a ‘federal union army’ comprising all ethnic nationalities equally in it and representing all national armed forces (Wansai 2018: 11). But, commander – in – chief of army said that ‘a country should have a single army to defend it’ (Taylor 2016: 7). Later, the ethnic groups and parties assumed that the Tatmadaw has strong desire to maintain its existing centralized power. Thus, Dr Andrew Selth (2015) noticed that ‘Only the Tatmadaw can end its political role’ (Selth 2015: 1). In other words, the military reform could be developed by the initiative of military men rather than the outside pressure.

#### **4.3 Endeavors for Peace Process**

During the administration of NLD government, the peace process became more inclusive by increasing the number of dialogue partners with different backgrounds. The government officials, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO), political parties, and the parliamentarians involved in the 2016 Union Peace Conference (UPC – also known as the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong Conference). Moreover, CSOs were granted as the observer status in National Dialogues and served as the delegates in the UPC in collaboration with EAO representatives (Win 2019: 17). Generally, CSOs in peace process have been taking part through formal and informal channels. As the formal, they participated in the CSOs peace forum within the framework of political dialogue. For the informal, they played outside the



CSOs forum by preparing a policy paper, or holding demonstration for peace (Lidauer et al., 2018: 16-19).

Even though they had a space in peace process, most of the CSOs were not satisfied with this situation because of their limited role in it. According to the statement of Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), those in the formal channel were allowed to discuss about social, economic and environmental issues only, and the other important matters such as politics and security affairs were excluded from the agenda of CSOs forum. Some CSOs leaders came to realize that the government viewed them as the 'service delivery' than dialogue partners (Lidauer et al., 2018: 20). Thus, marginalizing the space of CSOs in peace building activities has made a crack in their relationship with the government.

While CSOs were under struggle for equality in dialogue setting, some CSOs from Kayah State decided to withdraw from the CSOs forum. As their main reasons, the Tatmadaw and the NLD government were the key players in the decision making process, and CSOs were not given any chance to participate in it. Moreover, Ko Dee Dee, from the Karenni Peasants' Union, told to Frontier that if the Tatmadaw denied their presentations, all their efforts had come to naught. Thus, they had no desire to take part in this limited forum (Lynn 2018: paras. 12–14). It shows the different approaches CSOs which intended to expand their limited space with collectively and against separately. CSOs were not satisfying their current roles of observer status in the peace process. Therefore, they requested the respective heads of government and military to invite CSOs as the representatives at the upcoming Panglong Conferences. Mainly, they wanted a space in the peace process through widespread participating in various sectors.

## V. Conclusion

In order to complete the transitional stage with gently and successfully, there would be faced with the hard work of amending some provisions of the constitution, being presumed as inconsistency with the democratic values, and reducing the role of military in politics. The Indonesia transition was successfully accomplished with amending the constitution and official termination of military's dual function. Myanmar's transition reaches the halfway through a little progress because the Tatmadaw had withdrawn from day-to-day politics but has been still holding the legislative power until now. Moreover, there is much ambivalence about the amendment of 2008 constitution in the future.

Here, it should be noticed a different situation of stakeholders in Indonesia and Myanmar throughout the transitional period regarding their capability and the extent of their involvement in those important reform measures. Firstly, it was undeniable that the military reforms in Indonesia were initiated and headed by the pro-reformed generals. On the other hand, it should be noticed that the civilian experts in military studies and CSOs networks had been a close connection academically with some generous person from military after 1998. This personal tie might have a positive impact on the upcoming military reform in Indonesia. But, in Myanmar, the military and civilian organizations exist as the separate entities and they accused each other based on their perspectives; for instance, violation to the freedom of expression by the former and defamation of military's image by the latter. This is one of the differences between Indonesia and Myanmar.

Secondly, since the beginning of democratization in Indonesia, various CSOs were allowed to involve in policy formulation, parliament meetings and the discussions on constitutional reforms by collaborating with the members of parliaments, political parties and the government agencies. Otherwise, they were running as the independent groups to pressure the responsible persons. In Myanmar, the most responsible persons to conduct the essential

reforms are those being represented the government, military and parliament. The role of CSOs is not as prominent as those institutions because they have no power and no place in the restricted areas. Thus, they were operating outside the channel of parliament.

Thirdly, CSOs should be ready to cooperate with both the ruling party and the opposition parties anytime if they oriented towards a good transition. For example, during the Megawati administration, the Indonesian CSOs had collaborated with the Golkar party – the opposition party at that time – for the constitutional amendment. When facing the important time of transition, Indonesian CSOs accepted the invitation of Golkar party, regardless of its backing on the Suharto's regime in the past, to draw a proposal for amendments. Thus, without engaging in the partisan politics CSOs had collaborated with both ruling and opposition parties. If CSOs have partisan views, it would create self-limiting to their space.

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