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All Authors	Kyaw Swe Nyunt
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Abstract	This paper is a presentation, from historical point of view, with respect to the Independence movements in Myanmar from 1939 to 1945. It consists of national movements of independence struggles. It highlights the essence of Myanmar's independence struggle, which ended with success because of the solid unity of the whole population. The successful formation of <i>Bama Htwetyak Gaing</i> (Myanmar Liberation Gang), the participation of youths Organizations for the selection of military training to Japan, the position of Mandalay as headquarters of Upper Myanmar in forming Military Commands were to fight off the Japanese. This paper is prepared basing on original and secondary documents.
Keywords	YMBA, GCBA, Doebama Aiayone, BIA, Thakhin, PRP, AFO
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Abstract

This paper is a presentation, from historical point of view, with respect to the Independence movements in Myanmar from 1939 to 1945. It consists of national movements of independence struggles. It highlights the essence of Myanmar's independence struggle, which ended with success because of the solid unity of the whole population. The successful formation of *Bama Htwetyak Gaing* (Myanmar Liberation Gang), the participation of youths Organizations for the selection of military training to Japan, the position of Mandalay as headquarters of Upper Myanmar in forming Military Commands were to fight off the Japanese. This paper is prepared basing on original and secondary documents.

When the Second World War began, few among Burma's political leaders other than the Thakins were prepared to make statements or express opinions on Burma's position. Myanmar political leaders formed YMBA, GCBA and performed important public activities, to promote the national cause. The people opposed the colonial British by public rallies, demonstrations and strikes until the momentous people's Campaign of the year 1300 broke out. *Thakhins* and student leaders were more determined of the fact that they must fight the British for their independence during the time of World War II and the political unity was essential. Therefore on 1st October 1939, Myanmar patriots formed a national united corps (*Bama Htwetyak Gaing*) so called Burma Freedom Bloc with Dr. Ba Maw as its leader and former student union leader Thakin Aung San as general secretary.¹ The Organization was originally conceived of as a national united front to make the most of any opportunities which the war might provide to further the struggle for independence.

The Students and the Thakin had stood during the 1938-39 general strikes, were gradually coming to accept the idea of formerly opposed political groups working together to form a united front for independence. From the time the general strikes of 1938-39 were called off, the political leaders of mass movements such as the Dobama Asiayone and the Students' Union began an intense search for better means of struggle against the British Government. Almost all the student leaders were hostile to Fascism,

Nazism and Japanese militarism because they had absorbed a good measure of British democratic ideals and had absorbed a good deal of socialist ideology during the 1938-39 strikes. They viewed with admiration the struggle of the Chinese against the Japanese invaders, and Japan was the last country from which they thought of seeking help when they decided to establish a revolutionary underground movement after the 1938-39 strikes.

At the beginning of the war in Europe, the student leaders decided to take advantage of the opportunity to rebel against the British. So, they were to seek foreign help in their rebellion and formed underground revolutionary group as well as they needed outside help to achieve independence. When Japan could defeat Russia in Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Asian countries came to recognize Japan as the leader of Asia. Myanmar were pleased such slogans as "Japan the leader of Asia", "Japan the protector of Asia", "Japan the liberator of Asia", "Japan the light of Asia", "Asia for the Asian", and the propaganda like "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" were very attractive and effective in luring the support and the help of the Southeast Asian peoples including Myanmar, who had been exploited by Western colonialists for a long time.²

To get outside assistance, Thakin Aung San left for China in late 1940 disguised as a Chinese Crewman aboard a Norwegian boat. The ostensible purpose of his journey was to make contact with Chinese Communist. Thakin Aung San carried a letter of introduction from the Indian Communist Party in China. It was a madcap adventure, but arrest awaited him if he remained in Myanmar. Other aid from abroad seemed remote at the time. Thakin Aung San was arrested in Amoy by the Japanese. At that time Amoy was under the occupation of the Japanese. Thakin Aung San was released, as the pro-Japanese Thakin Ba Sein told the Japanese agents at Yangon that Thakin Aung San had really been seeking aid from Japan.

At that time, the policy of the Japanese Imperial government was to use Myanmar as pawns on its Southeast Asian Military Chess Board. Then, Myanmar was to be used as bait in the Japanese military campaign in Southeast Asia. Geopolitically the location of Myanmar was very important at that time because Myanmar shared borders with China, French Indochina, Thailand and India. The Japanese army made a quick invasion into the Shan States after the fall of Taungoo. The Japanese army swept up to Karenni and to the

Southern Shan States occupying the key road from Taunggyi to Lashio to block the Burma Road to China. There were three other main roads giving access to the Shan States.

The first road was the one that connected Mandalay, the heart of Myanmar, with Lashio, the northern capital of Shan States, and then to the border of China. Through this road the British sent arms and other war material to China.

The second road was the one from Thazi to Taunggyi and then to Keng Tung and to the Thai border. The third road was the one that linked the two from Lashio, Hsipaw to Loi lem and then to Taunggyi and from there the road turned south to Karenni and beyond that to Taungoo in Myanmar. All these roads were well built by the British during their occupation period. Moreover in invading, the Japanese not only used land forces but also air power.

When the British evacuated from Myanmar, the British sought the help of China and the Nationalist Government President Chiang Kai Shek agreed to send his troops. The 93rd Division of the Chinese army moved into Keng Tung to guard the borders of French Indo-China and Thailand. The 249th and the 55th Divisions moved in by the Burma Road to take up positions in Karenni and northwards to protect the Thai border from Keng Tung to Myanmar.³ The Chinese soldiers were generally not well trained nor well equipped like the Japanese. The Chinese were badly defeated by superior numbers and mechanized equipment, including airplanes, against which they had no defense.

At that time, the Japanese had established a spy network within Burma, posing as trader or as doctors or dentists, with some of them spread about in country. But it was only after the completion of the Burma Road linking the port of Rangoon with Kunming in Yunnan that the Japanese military began direct, active military intelligence activities. There were three main agents of active intelligence operations for Burma. They were, Shozo Kokubu who was a long-term resident in Burma, the Consulate had been cautiously gathering intelligence since the mid 1930s and Colonel Keiji Suzuki was to study means of putting the Burma Road out of action.

Thakin Ba Sein had been in contact with the Japanese Navy's Shozo Kokubu since early 1940. By the middle of that year, Naval Headquarters in Japan had invited Thakin Ba Sein to come to Japan to present his plans. Thakin Ba Sein presented his plans

for Burma, which included military aid for the Burmese independence revolution. Colonel Suzuki came to Burma in July 1940 with two companions. His main task was to study the situation to determine how to deny the use of the Burma Road to China. The military part of plans provided for Japanese aid in training, arms and other resources for the Burmese revolt.

In February 1941, Thakin Aung San returned to Myanmar to present the Manami Kikan's plans to the Underground. He got the cooperation of Thakins Mya, Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein to form the pro-Japanese People's Revolutionary Party. Thakin Ba Sein and Tun Oak were also prominently pro-Japanese. Thakins Mya, Aung San, Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein and Saya Chit discussed with the Japanese agents. They made the following important decisions:

1. Japan must give Myanmar arms and ammunition.
2. Japan must give young Myanmar the military training.
3. Myanmar would send young Myanmar to Japan.
4. Myanmar themselves would fight against the British to get independence.
5. Japan would recognize the independent Myanmar.

Burmese Patriotic youths took aid for independence of Burma from the Japanese. Therefore the pick of the Thirty Burmese young comrades were sent in four batches secretly to Japan for military training. Most of the training of the thirty comrades took place on Hainan Island. The Japanese adviser supervisor of the thirty heroes was one Colonel Suzuki. He was later became known as Bo Mogyo.

The fall of Singapore in February 1942 sealed the fate of Myanmar. The Japanese took Burma in three strategic phases.

1. Penetration into the Tenasserim Peninsula leading to the battle at the Sittang Bridge: the main tactic was penetration of small forces behind the enemy lines.
2. The fall of Sittang made the evacuation of Rangoon inevitable and after regrouping and being reinforced at Rangoon from the sea, the Japanese next took the key gateways into northern Myanmar: Prome in the west and Taungoo in the east. The British made a determined stand before Prome, at Shwedaung, but Taungoo, defended by ill-equipped Chinese troops, fell

without serious combat. After this, there was a race for the oil fields, but the British made one final stand and the Japanese were prevented from acquiring the fields intact. Following this, there was no further serious resistance; the Japanese simply rushed into Mandalay and as far north as Bhamo and Myitkyina.

3. The Japanese attack was to block the retreat routes east and west. To the east, they succeeded in blocking the Chinese forces because of the good road network. But towards India they encountered difficulties both because there were only rough and hurriedly made dirt tracks and because few British forces remained after they had crossed the Irrawaddy. At every stage the newly formed units of the British Burma Army were breaking up. Men disappeared, even sometimes were left behind because of the too hasty demolition of a bridge. After the battle for the oil fields the British officers made no attempt to prevent the local troops from returning home; there was little transport and no prospect of another major battle. The British army elements were now preoccupied with getting to India by the fastest means possible, and this led to much disruption of the civil administration.⁴

The thirty comrades formed BIA (Burma Independence Army) with Burmese Nationals in Bangkok on 26th December 1941. BIA along with the Japanese army marched in four columns into Burma and fought the British.⁵ For the purpose of making preliminary preparations, some secret reconnoiter groups were sent into Burma. This group consisting of *Thakhin* Hla Pe (a) *Bo* Letyar (Pyinmana), *Thakhin* Ba Gyan (a) *Bo* La Yaung, along with two Japanese officers secretly attempted to enter Burma on 22nd November 1941 but they were arrested by the Thai police. The second group consisting of *Ko* Hla Maung (*Bo* Zeya), and *Thakhin* Htun Khin (*Bo* Myint Swe) were successfully able to enter Burma and they reached Mawlamyaing. The third group consisted of *Thakhin* Shu Maung (General Ne Win), *Thakhin* Htun Shwe (*Bo* Lin Yon), *Thakhin* Than Tin, *Thakhin* Kyaw Sein and *Ko* Khin Maung Oo (*Bo* Taya of Pyinmana).⁶

Those secret groups met with underground contacts in advance and made plans on how the Japanese army and BIA would fight the British. They provided basic military training with small arms for Burmese youths. With a view to blockading the retreat of the

British, they gave instructions to destroy roads, railroads and bridges in advance. They were also instructed to contact Burmese patriotic soldiers under the Burma rifle regiment and persuade them to come over to the side of BIA and to occupy the towns under the British in advance and prepare for administration.

General Ne Win who led the third group reached Yangon on 2nd February 1942 and provided basic military training to patriotic youths. U Khin Maung Lay (school teacher) of Mandalay, *Bo Thiha* (a) *Thakhin Ko* (Pinyinmana), *Thakhin Hla Tin Ka Lay* both brought by *Bo Taya* attended the military training arranged at Bago by Col. Ne Win and *Bo Moe Nyo*.⁷

The Japanese heavily bombed Mandalay by air. The Japanese estimated that the strength of the British all over Burma at that time were, 37 regiments, 13 companies of artillery, and about 40,000 soldiers, who were mainly stationed at Rangoon, Mandalay, 3 districts in Mawlamyaing, and Shan State.⁸ While the Japanese Troops marched to Upper Burma along the Ayeyarwady River and along Mandalay highway, the Japanese heavily bombed Mandalay.⁹ On 3rd April 1942 at 11:00 am about 80 Japanese planes came and bombarded Mandalay. There were very few people who took cover. People numbering 2000 to 3000 were killed and nearly 3000 people were wounded. It was the greatest damage and casualty due to bombardment throughout the war.¹⁰ Mandalay, after being heavily bombarded on 3rd April, was further bombarded four times and was nearly reduced to ashes.¹¹

BIA and the Japanese army were successfully capable of occupying town after town. The Japanese had promised that they would give independence to Myanmar after having occupied Mawlamyine. But they broke their promise. BIA troops occupied Yangon in March 1942. The British retreated to India. The strength of the British air force was much weaker than that of the Japanese. Due to the air raid of the Japanese, Prome (Pyay), Taung Gyi, Lashio, Maymyo, and the towns in Mandalay District, Meikhtila, Thazi, and Pinyinmana were burnt down and nearly reduced to nothing.¹²

On 19th April 1942, BIA and the Japanese army were able to occupy Pinyinmana and proceeded to the north.¹³ On 24th April 1942 the Chinese division that was stationed at Pyawbwe started retreating. For the purpose of the retreat of the Chinese division and the British army, the key terrains were Myitnge Bridge and Sagaing Bridge. In order not

to damage those bridges and not to be blockaded, 17th India division remained as rear guard to delay the approaching Japanese army from Meikhtila. The 38th Chinese division and the 17th armored brigades were stationed at Sagaing and Ohndaw Village, with a view of protecting the Sagaing Bridge. The British planned for final retreat on 27th April, but it failed. The reason for failure was that BIA and the Japanese troops fought the British army stationed at Meikhtila on 28th April 1942. As the final retreat was rigidly fixed, the British fought back violently. The battle was violent on both sides. In the same way battles broke out near Kyaukse.

According to the British, 650 Japanese soldiers were killed in the attack and only ten British soldiers were killed and three tanks were destroyed.¹⁴ The Commander in-chief of the Japanese 15th Army maneuvered to launch an offensive to Mandalay by commanding the 18th division to march to the east of Yamethin, and the 55th division the south of Myitnge River, and fought the British troops. After that, on 1st May 1942, the Japanese crossed the Myitnge River and BIA (marching in mid-column) the Japanese army occupied Mandalay, at 6:20 pm.¹⁵ After the fall of Mandalay, Japanese policy changed totally and this was reflected in the attitudes of the Japanese military right down to the lowest ranks.

The ulterior motive of the Japanese gradually became obvious. Burmese people began to distrust the Japanese. The Japanese did not keep their promise and that it was impossible to trust the Japanese and that Burmese people should struggle on their own for independence. *Thakhin* Soe and *Thakhin* Tun Pe were assigned to make contact with the Allies and if necessary, to go over up to China and India. The Japanese military police started to arrest and torture suspected persons in Mandalay and Sagaing.¹⁶ The "Thirty Comrades" and BIA gradually knew the Japanese's attitude and they began to have anti Japanese feelings. It is learnt that since the time *Thakhin* Aung San was in Thailand he wrote a letter to the comrades in Burma warning that the Japanese were not trustworthy and Burmese nationals had to rely on their own.

Before the time BIA was formed in Thailand as well as at the time BIA was formed, the "Thirty Comrades" sent pilots cells to Burma to prepare for anti-Japanese movement. The plan of Thirty Comrades since the time they were in Thailand was that they would declare independence, form a provisional government and would declare war

against the British and would send BIA troops into Burma to fight the Japanese. The Japanese however did not allow to carry out that plan and said that they would declare Burma's Independence when they reach Mawlamyaing and then they postponed the time to when they reach Rangoon. BIA therefore, when they reach Bamaw, even wanted to go to China and joined the Chinese army.¹⁷ These facts show that it is apparent that the Burmese distrusted the Japanese before the Japanese entered Burma.

When the whole of Burma fell under Japanese army, the military administration was established. On 10th June, 1942 the Minmigan was dissolved and *Bo Mogyo*, the head of Minami was sent back to Japan. Although military administration had been established, the cooperation of the nationals was still needed. Accordingly the Japanese army allowed Burma to form an administrative body consisting of Burmese nationals. On 1st August 1942 a provisional administrative body led by Dr. Ba Maw was formed. The provisional administrative body, however, was just a makeweight, because Dr. Ba Maw himself had to report to the Japanese commander-in-chief if he went out of Yangon or came back to Yangon.¹⁸ The Japanese made Burmese nationals form the Asian Youths Organization with a view to using Burmese youths to win the war in South East Asia. On 28th June, 1942 Asian Youths Organization led by U Ba Gyan (Chairman) was formed with active youths. Many youths joined the organization, with the intention of preparing for resistance, but on the surface had to follow Japanese instruction.¹⁹

On 27th July 1942, the Japanese reorganized BIA into BDA (Burma Defence Army). The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of BDA were formed and stationed in Pyinmana.²⁰ General Aung San was appointed as Commander-in-chief. At the beginning the three battalions consisted of only about 3000 soldiers. But later the strength grew up to six battalions in April 1943.²¹ Thakin Tin Shwe secretly came to Yangon and met General Aung San and Thakins prepared to revolt against the Japanese openly. On 28 January 1943 Tojo, the Prime Minister of Japan, made a speech at Diet. In his speech he said that the Japanese Government desire to give Myanmar Independence. General Aung San left for Tokyo on 12 March 1943 and had discussions with the Japanese Government for Myanmar Independence. Thus Myanmar Independence was given on 8 May 1943. General Iida withdrew the Military Administration on Myanmar on 1st August 1943 and announced the Independence of Myanmar. However it was gold plated independence.²²

Toward the middle of 1943, both the members of Burma Defence Army (BDA) and political leaders consisting of Thakin Than Tun began to consider making resistance movement before the end of 1943. General Aung San wrote an article titled *Lutlat Ye Aye Taw Pom* in which he expressed that it was too early to cry out the world *we got victory*. General Aung San had to unite BNA, Communist Party and People's Revolutionary Party into one to draw detailed plan for Anti-Fascist Movement, to contact the comrades who were sent to Allies, to get back up support needed for the Anti-Fascist Movement and finally to make grass root level organization, so that it would spread to the whole population.

Japanese troops were defeated by the victorious British troops at Inphal battle front which began on 15 March 1944. During June and July 1944, South East Asia Command (SEAC) headquarters had drawn detailed strategic plans to open new battle fronts. The aim of the strategy was to surround the Japanese troops, retreating from Inpha to Yeoo and to annihilate them and as a next step to retake Mandalay. In the middle of July, Japanese troops had to retreat from Inphal. Meanwhile, General Stiwell's troops occupied Myitkyina in Northern Myanmar on 3rd August 1944. Allied troops began to plan offensive to reoccupy Myanmar when Japanese troops retreated from Kohema front. After 1944 the scattered anti-fascist resistance units which were acting separately got united. From 4th August to 7th August 1944 General Aung San and the communist representatives discussed and organized the Anti-fascist organization (AFO).²³ That organization consisted of BNA, the Communist Party and *Pyithu Ayaytawpon Party*. Later Asian Youths Organization, after renaming as "whole Burma Youths Organization", joined AFO.²⁴

In order to raise armed opposition and drive out the Japanese, Burmese political leaders made contact with the Allies. There had been anti-Japanese groups inside *Dohbama Asiayone* since before the Japanese invasion. Among them, *Thakhin* Thein Pe Myint and *Thakhin* Tin Shwe of Kyaukse went to India and attempted to get contact with the Allies. However the Allies did not treat them as allies and put them under house-arrest for five months. The Allies did not accept their request to cooperate with Burmese Anti-Fascist Organization and other resistance groups fighting against the Japanese. At first the Allies did not trust them, but later, the Allies agreed to cooperate the anti-Fascist

forces join them²⁵ and accordingly A.F.O (Anti Fascist Organization) sent group after group of comrades to India. Thirty men from Burma arrived in India and there were altogether about 80 including Ko Thein Pe Myimt, *Thakhin* Tin Shwe, Ma Khin Si (Kyaukse) Arakanese (now Rakhine) comrades who had first arrived there first.²⁶

In the meantime from December 1944 to February 1945, In Rakhine the Arakan (Rakhine) patriots with the cooperation of the Allied forces were fighting against the Japanese.²⁷ So, on 1st March 1945 AFO headquarters leaders held a meeting for three days. This meeting resulted in a decision to fight the Japanese by forming military Commands. According to the decision, to drive out the Fascist Japanese, the resistance troops were divided into seven military Commands and three special regions. The Japanese troops stationed at Meikhtila and its vicinity was heavily bombed every day.²⁸ The military situation of the areas to the north and west of Meikhtila were getting worse. Due to everyday bombing of the Allied bombers to the north of Meikhtila, the Japanese 15th division, 31st division and 33rd division were falling in strength. A British India Battalion crossed the Ayeyawaddy River from the south of Pakhokku and reached western front of the Meikhtila on 21st February 1945.²⁹ The Allied troops with more than 100 tanks entered Meikhtila on 26 February, 1945 and occupied Meikhtila airfield on 27 February, 1945. That airfield was an important military base for the 15th Japanese battalion in Meikhtila. In addition, it was the first Japanese airbase of the Japanese in Burma.³⁰ The Resistance movement started nationwide on 27th March. On 11th August 1945, the Japanese surrendered.³¹

In Conclusion, YMBA started to perform political activities. In sending YMBA delegations to India and England, representatives were selected. And then, associations of GCBA (General Council of Burmese Associations) were formed in everywhere. The sangha also took part in national movements and political movements by forming union of Sangha. There were hidden camps for underground activities. Underground resistance Units and cells were formed at every locality throughout the country. To drive out the British from Myanmar, "Thirty Comrades" were sent to Japan for military training. The Japanese allowed Burmese nationals to form the Asian Youths Organization with a view to organization Burmese youths to join with Japan in South East Asia. In order to prepare for revolution the youths during that time organized according to the will of the Japanese.

Asian Youths Organizations were formed and members of the organization took part in underground activities at the risk and danger of their lives. The Japanese Anti-Fascist forces were formed all over the country. Such organizations were formed. Burmese political leaders, in order to raise armed opposition against the Japanese tried to get contact with the Allies. The political leaders of the organization sent selected persons to India. The comrades (male and female) from different regions took part in above-mentioned activities. National leaders of Burma divided military Commands to fight off the Japanese. The period from 1941 to 1945 seemed to be a short but for the people of Myanmar; it meant a long period of suffering. Myanmar was a war zone of fighting between the British-Chinese forces and the Japanese forces.

¹ *Dohbama Asiayone Thamaing* (History of Dohbama Asiayone), Asiayone Thamaing Pyusuye Aphwe (compilation Committee of Dohbama Asiayone History), Vol.II, Yangon, Sarpeibeikman Press, 1976, p.482 (Henceforth: *Dohbama Asiayone* , 1976 b)

² D.G.E Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*, London, Mcmillan, 1964, p.774

³ Clarence Hendershot, "Role of the Shan States, in the Japanese Conquest of Burma", *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 2 May 1943, p.254

⁴ Collis, Maurice, *First and Last in Burma(1941-48)*, Faber, London, 1956, Chapter 16-17

⁵ Thutaythana Yebaw, *Yebawthonekyeik Hnint Bama Lutlatyay Tatmataw Sikkyauung - myar* (Thirty Comrades and Columns of Burma Independence Army), Yangon, Ye Ohn Kyaw Press, 1975, p. 23 (Henceforth: Yebaw, 1975)

⁶ *Dohbama Asiayone*, 1976 b, 551

⁷ Yebaw, 1975, 78-81

⁸ *Sitokechokeyaykhit Myanmar Naingngan* (Japanese Military Regime in Myanmar) (translated by Mr Onotoru), Yangon, Kumara Press, 1975, p.6 (Henceforth: *Sitokechokeyay*, 1975)

⁹ *Ingaleik- Myanmar Nauksonteikpwegyi 1941-1948* (The last Anglo-Myanmar battle 1941-1948) (translated by U Khin Mg Gyi 1965), Yangon, Mangala Press,1965, pp.267-268 (Henceforth: *Ingaleik- Myanmar Teikpwe*, 1965)

¹⁰ Ludu U Hla, *Thatinsarmyar Pyawpyate Sittwin Bamarpyi* (Burma at war told by the newspapers), Vol.I, Mandalay, Kyipwaryay Press,1969, pp.139-143 (Henceforth: Hla, 1969a)

¹¹ *Ingaleik- Myanmar Teikpwe*, 1965, 286

¹² Hla, 1969 a, 47

¹³ "Mandalay Hmattan", 1985, 212-213

¹⁴ Hla, 1969 a, 51-52

¹⁵ *Sitokechokeyay*, 1975, 12-13

¹⁶ Yebaw, 1975, 114-115

¹⁷ Aung San, *Resistance Movement; Burma's Challenge*, Yangon, Tathetta Sarpay, 1946, p.36-39 (Henceforth: Aung San ,1946)

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- ¹⁸ U Nu, *Ngannityarhi Bamarpyi* (Burma in Half of a Decade), Yangon, Yawghi Press, 1946, p. 164 (Henceforth: Nu, 1946)
- ¹⁹ *Dohbama Asiayone*, 1976 b, 565
- ²⁰ Bo Than Tai, *Lutlatyay Ayaytawpon Hmattan*, (The Chronicle of Independence Campaign), Vol. I, Yangon, Sarpebeikman Press, 1967, p. 210 (Henceforth: Than Tai, 1967a)
- ²¹ *Yebaw Thonekyeik Hnint Minami Hlyohwetaphwe* (Thirty Comrades and Minami) (translated by Thihabala Mya Thaung), Yangon, Pyithualin Press, 1976, p.300 (Henceforth: *Yebaw Thonekyeik*, 1976)
- ²² *Yebaw Thonekyeik Hnint Minami Hlyohwetaphwe* (Thirty Comrades and Minami) (translated by Thihabala Mya Thaung), Yangon, Pyithualin Press, 1976, p.301 (Henceforth: *Yebaw Thonekyeik*, 1976)
- ²³ Aung San, 1946, 44
- ²⁴ *Sitokechokeyay*, 1975, 427
- ²⁵ Thein Pe Myint, *Mahameik Hnint Bamataman* (The Allies and Burmese Herald), Yangon, Sapawe Press, 1962, p. 72 (Henceforth: Thein Pe Myint, 1962)
- ²⁶ Thein Pe Myint, 1962, 160
- ²⁷ Thakhin Tin Mya, *Phet-sit Tawlangyay Htanadhoke Hnint Tai-se-tai* (Facist Resistance Headquarters and Ten Commands), Yangon, Aungnaithu Press, 1968, p. 57 (Henceforth: Tin Mya, 1968)
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- ²⁹ *Sitokechokeyay*, 1975, 47-50
- ³⁰ *Sitokechokeyay*, 1975, 47-50
- ³¹ *Tatmataw Thamaing (1945-48)* (History of Tatmataw 1945-48), Vol.III, Thatin Hnint Sarnesin Lokengan (New paper and Journalism), Printing unknown, 1999, p.20.