

CHINA'S POLICY TOWARDS MYANMAR AFTER 2011

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Abstract

This paper argues that Myanmar is in the key factor of Chinese strategic goals. Although Myanmar endeavored to reintegrate itself into the international community or its rapprochement with the United States, China has tried to pursue its foreign policy to Myanmar better than ever before in particular after 2011. On the other hand, it can be said that China for its national interests, continues to make an effort to pursue the appropriate diplomacy towards Myanmar. Therefore, in order to forecast the future prospect of Sino-Myanmar relations, it needs to study Chinese strategic goals towards Myanmar and how Myanmar responses to its policy. Moreover, the influence on Sino-Myanmar relations exerted by other factors such as anti-China sentiment came from Myanmar's people society will also be discussed. Finally, this paper will attempt to analyze the strategic interests of the rising China on Myanmar.

Keywords: China, Myanmar, foreign policy, strategic goal, national interest, diplomacy

Introduction

Geographically, China and Myanmar have approximately 2200 km border and diplomatic relations were established between the two countries early in 1950. In fact, since Myanmar became an independent nation in 1948 from Great Britain, Chinese attention has been focused on Myanmar's strategic importance. When the National troops of Chiang Kai-shev were being driven out by the communist forces and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, some nationalist forces invaded Shan state of Myanmar in the hope of positioning for a counter attack against the Communist government. China pursued an assertive foreign policy from 1949 until 1954 and supported the Burma Communist Party (BCP) against the government in Yangon. But as the political changes in PRC, China made a decision to be flexible in its foreign policy. Thus, China maintained dual track diplomacy in dealing with Myanmar government. It was only after the beginning of the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s that Myanmar's leaders began to build up a new level of trust. From 1986 to 1987,

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the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) went on the offensive against the BCP and recaptured the trade route along the border.

In 1988, China made normal relations with cordial friendliness upon Myanmar. After the 1988 internal political upheaval, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), was pressured by the western countries in particular the United States and the European Union (EU) began imposing sanctions on the country. But China did not make the intervention and only gave necessary assistance and initiated a strong bilateral relationship with Myanmar new military government. Then the leaders of the two countries made mutual visits. Since diplomatic relations were established in 1950, China and Myanmar has adhered to pursue the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and maintained their Paukphyaw Friendship until now. In relations with China, Myanmar government reiterated often that it will continue to follow “one China” policy and will never develop any official contacts with Taiwan. In fact, the support for one China policy is part of Chinese political and strategic needs. Thus, Sino-Myanmar relations since 1988, has been closer than ever before.

However, when President U Thein Sein government came to power in March 2011, the Sino-Myanmar relationship started showing delicate changes. Myanmar, in order to separate itself from over dependence on China, it began to find out ways to improve its relations with the US and some western countries. After President Obama visited Myanmar in November 2012 and hosted President U Thein Sein in Washington in May 2013, this signaled Myanmar came back to the international community. The US started developing its economic relationship with Myanmar by lifting some restrictions on American companies investing in Myanmar. Under the Barack Obama government, the US reinstated Myanmar’s eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences benefits after imposition of economic sanctions against Myanmar for more than two decades. Today, Myanmar’s bilateral trade with the US during the 2017-2018 fiscal year hit US\$ 718 million. Then, the US made investments of \$ 129 million in Myanmar during the same year. The follow by the US, the European Countries (EU) also made investments of US\$ 6.6 billion in Myanmar as of April 2018. There are 300 registered EU companies in Myanmar. Therefore, after President U Thein

Sein took power, China's situation in Myanmar has been relatively no stronger. Moreover, China has also faced anti-sentiment among Myanmar people due to its realist diplomacy. To maintain its formal status and to achieve its strategic interests in Myanmar, China seems to understand that it needs to pursue its appropriate diplomacy with Myanmar.

Thus, in order to forecast the future prospect of Sino-Myanmar relations, it is necessary to study Chinese strategic goals towards Myanmar and how Myanmar responds to its policy. Moreover, the influence on Sino-Myanmar relations exerted by other factors such as anti-China sentiment came from Myanmar people society will also be discussed.

Myanmar in the importance of Chinese Strategic goals

Myanmar is located in Southeast Asia between China and India. Myanmar geostrategic location is the most important factor in military, politics and security, energy resources and economic considerations. Economically, Myanmar is the bridge of inland trade and commerce strategic country between Southeast Asia and South Asia. It is strategically located at the edge of India Ocean. Myanmar shares a common border with China in the North and Northeast, with Laos and Thailand in the East and Southeast, with India and Bangladesh in the West. Then, Myanmar possesses 1385 miles of coastlines, bounded in the west by the Bay of Bengal and in the south by Andaman Sea, through which Myanmar can access to the Indian Ocean. Thus, Myanmar's strategic position has needed stable relationship with giant neighbors, China and India and its other immediate neighbors.

After 2011, its rapprochement with the United States (US), Myanmar could now play the role of geopolitical pivot in the strategic competition between the US and China and India and China. Myanmar's location allows Chinese resource shipments to avoid sea-lanes choke points, the Strait of Malacca and provides access to the Indian Ocean. Thus, Myanmar can give an outlet for China's less-developed western provinces such as Yunnan. For the landlocked Yunnan, securing access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar as a land bridge is important for achieving trading routes as well as for security. The proposed railway construction between Kyaukphyu and Muse will serve as a corridor for Chinese exports to western markets. The other route will be

created by constructing a river port on Bhamo in Kachin State, from which the Ayeyawaddy River will lead to the Yangon and Thilawa. On April 27, 2011, the China Railways Engineering Corporation and Myanmar Union Ministry of Rail Transportation signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the construction of a railway from Muse to Kyaukphyu. The development of a port and a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kyaukphyu will serve Chinese strategic interests on the Indian Ocean. Thus, Myanmar location will also be part of China's two Ocean strategies to win access to the Pacific and Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, Sino-Myanmar connection is strategically useful for China to contain India's influence in Southeast Asia especially its neighbor, Myanmar. Being sandwiched by the Indian sub-continent and China, Myanmar is strategically important for the two rival regional powers China and India. The rising China desires to be a regional great power in shaping future world events. Then currently, China has been emerging as a truly global power, the biggest economy in the world, and shaping everyone's future. For its security, China has enhanced its military cooperation and exchanges with Myanmar since 1988.

Actually, after 1988 upheaval in Myanmar, mutual relations with China has been increasingly cordial than ever before, driven by geostrategic significance of Myanmar. Myanmar government has had the unintended consequences of encouraging ties with China. During the period of western sanctions on Myanmar, a spillover from China was like a tidal wave in Myanmar especially Mandalay. There were no western companies and few Myanmar competitors. The Chinese were entering a vacuum and taking advantages of a new opening. Thus, China could promote its economic cooperation and investment throughout the period of Myanmar's military government.

In fact, China has economically developed a strong interest in securing Myanmar's plentiful natural resources. China's heavy investment in Myanmar is not only in the oil and gas sector but also in mineral extraction. It also exploits Myanmar's water resources for electric power generation. Then, Myanmar also provides a market for its commodity. Moreover, China has recently constructed both oil and gas pipelines through Myanmar, connecting

Kyaukphyu with Kunming in Yunnan Province. The plan is also to transport crude oil, which is carried by tankers from the Middle East and Africa to Myanmar, through a pipeline to the Yunnan Province in China. It was because industrializing China really needs most energy from the outside world. Thus, the pipelines can serve the strategic interests and also economical in the sense of by-passing the Malaca Strait. Another project is the construction of hydroelectric dams in the border area which is underway. The electricity generated in Myanmar will be sent to Yunnan Province. The China Power Investment Corporation planned to construct seven hydroelectric dams along the upriver basin of the Ayeyawaddy River. But among them, the Myitsone Dam was suspended by President U Thein Sein on September 30, 2011. However, the other six dams have still under plans to construct. Thus, Myanmar actually is a source of energy supply for China.

In addition, the securing of border trade routes and the stability of border regions is vital for Chinese strategic interests in Myanmar. In economic factor, trade at the people to people level is mainly implemented at the upper Myanmar, Shan and Kachin States and the border of Yunnan. China tops the lists of foreign countries with investments in Myanmar till the end of February according to the 2015-2016 fiscal year released by the Directorate of Investment and Companies Administration. Under this 2015-2016 fiscal year, China stands first with over US\$ 15 billion worth of 126 investment projects, followed by Singapore with over \$ 12 billion in 199 projects.

According to official statistics, bilateral trade between Myanmar and China amounted to over 10 billion US dollars in 2014-2015 fiscal year. Of the total, Myanmar's export to China hit 4.6 billion dollars. And the bilateral trade between Myanmar and China hit over 9.4 billion US dollars in first ten months (April-January) of 2015-2016 fiscal Year sources with Ministry of Commerce. During the period, Myanmar mainly exports oil and gas, agricultural products to China. The imports from China include industrial products and commodities. However, the border trade has played a major role in the trade between the two countries. Thus, China needs the border stability between the two countries in order to operate its strategic economic factors in Myanmar. China will cooperate with any government that comes to power in

Myanmar in the interest of stability and smooth economic relations in order to achieve its national interests.

In contrast, the ethnic armed groups in the Myanmar side have conducted antigovernment activities for a long time with the support of the Chinese Communist Party. But these armed forces have produced narcotics or stimulant drugs in order to export into China. Therefore, the border security remains a key concern for China. Indeed, Myanmar's political stability is very important for Chinese security. Myanmar ethnic armed conflict is harmful to Chinese border security and stability. At the same time, China is anxious in the internalization of such a KIA and MAF conflict. They are still fighting even today. Thus, it can be said that China has these key strategic interests in Myanmar as mentioned above particularly to access to the Indian Ocean, to get energy security and security of the border areas.

However, these key strategic interests will be able to support its grand strategic project: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI project were proposed in 2013 to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in new infrastructure investments and upgrades including highways, pipelines, railroads, and power grids, along with related port and logistics upgrades in maritime partner countries. The BRI or OBOR (One Belt One Road) focuses on connecting China to Europe. The BRI certainly have to pass the Indian Ocean through Myanmar in connecting China to Europe. Then, China today has tried to implement China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Kyaukphyu deep sea port and border economic zone along all Sino-Myanmar border as part of the BRI project. Thus, Myanmar' geostrategic location is very important for Chinese strategic interests' goals.

Myanmar Perception and Reaction towards China

Myanmar is a country where the basic national aims have not changed over the years since its independence in 1948. Myanmar has maintained its sovereignty and national interests by pursuing independent and active foreign policy. Myanmar's leaders are strongly committed to its basic national aims: political independence, territorial integrity, security, unity and self-reliance. Myanmar historically has relied on a foreign policy of strict neutrality, coupled with low-key bilateral relations based on the Five Principles of

Peaceful Co-existence. It can be learned from the successive governments' practicing foreign policy respectively. After President U Thein Sein came to power, in his inaugural speech on March 30, 2011, he confirmed that his government would continue to exercise a non-aligned, independent and active foreign affairs policy and dealt with other countries in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence although successive governments have practiced different political and economic policies and concepts.

Similarly, it can be learned from today new NLD government's foreign policy. On April 22, in a meeting with foreign diplomats at her office in Nay Pyi Taw, Union Foreign Minister, Daw Aung San Su Kyi clarified that her government's foreign policy is oriented to the protection of national interests and environmental sustainability. In addition, she added that the policy also holds in high esteem such virtues as freedom, sovereignty, culture and tradition and national solidarity. There has been a dramatic shift of emphasis in the country's foreign policy from "bilateral relations" to "regional integration" and "multilateralism". The NLD government's foreign policy is aimed at enabling cooperation with neighboring countries in an effort to maintain peace, regionally and globally.

Myanmar Geopolitical ramifications have been overwhelmingly determined by bilateral relations with China. From Myanmar's perspective, its government has always watched China with great suspicion. This is why Chinese government historically maintained "dual track diplomacy" in dealing with Myanmar government and the outlawed BCP. Since the by-elections of 2012, China has engaged with political parties and civil society organizations. Then, China has also engaged on a charm offensive of public diplomacy in Myanmar. At the same time, Myanmar government has been particularly concerned about Chinese involvement in and support for the UWSA (United Wa State Army) in order to use as leverage against Myanmar government. Moreover, Myanmar government also perceives as a threat from the China's huge population particularly the growing Chinese population in Myanmar and their wealth. On the other hand, China's investment into joint ventures with Myanmar's military government's owned companies is a great dissatisfaction among the Myanmar people as the military government had survived through increased funding from China. China's three big projects: the Myitsone

Hydropower Dam project, the Lapaduang Copper Mine project and the Kyaukphyu- Kummin Oil and Gas Pipelines project are controversial as none of them helps Myanmar with the sustainable development, technology transfer and long term employment opportunities, but just leaves the country with great environmental and social impacts. Thus, anti-China sentiments among Myanmar people have risen sharply since 1988 up to present. Then, Myanmar government had become aware of China's international obligations and its desires to project and maintain a positive image among the international community. It was because during the crackdown on the monk-led anti-government demonstration of September 2007, China played an important role in facilitating meeting between the Myanmar military government and the UN. Myanmar people has become anxious China's influence on its domestic affair. Thus, the key influent factor on Myanmar relations with China after 2011 is the anti-Chinese sentiment and negative attitude towards China.

However, China and Myanmar has become strategic friends since 1988 until present time. The strategic cooperation between the two countries in 1989 had coincided because of the West's diplomatic isolation of Myanmar. Due to isolation and its necessity, Myanmar decided to move closer to China so as to seek both military and economic development assistance. In this situation, it is possible that China saw a golden opportunity to fill the strategic vacuum in Myanmar economic crises. When the border first opened up in the 1980s, cheap Chinese goods came into Myanmar markets and then, came the logging on a huge scale for trading to China. The trade in heroin developed long a staple of the Golden Triangle. Chinese businessmen rent the land from local authorities for growing rubber, sugar cane and pineapples. The enormous new Chinese-owned and run plantations could be seen over the border. Myanmar snow leopards, rhinos and other endangered species are being hunted and shipped across to impatient customers on the border. Moreover, women are usually tricked into believing they are going to a new job in China. Thus, the successive Myanmar governments have become understand to solve the growing Chinese factors in Myanmar. Thus, when President U Thein Sein took power, he suspended the Myitsone hydropower dam project on 30 September, 2011 in response to increasing public opinion against the project by the Myanmar people and strong protest over the construction of the dam. At the same time, under his government, Myanmar

has involved rapprochement with the United States in order to reduce its over-reliance on China. Since 2011, Myanmar has currently been taking further steps in the reform process and to improve its relations with the U.S and other Western countries. In addition, in line with reducing its dependence on China, Myanmar has promoted its cooperation with India as China's regional power rival by using Indian look east or today look act policy.

To reduce its over-dependence on China, Myanmar decided to adopt a "counter balancing" strategy by diversifying its diplomacy, welcoming the U.S, India and ASEAN countries as well as encouraging Japan and other industrialized nations like Singapore and the EU to invest in the country. The United Kingdom tops the list of European member states making investments in Myanmar according to the Myanmar Investment Commission. Myanmar received a total of over \$ 23.84 billion in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between the 2011-2012 FY and the 2015-2016 FY (according to the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration). Moreover, under the new government President U Htin Kyaw came to power in April 2016, Myanmar can attract more FDI and acquire new technology and skills for its labor force to overcome the structural weakness and backwardness of its economy. On the other hand, Myanmar government made effort to achieve the nationwide ceasefire concord with all armed ethnic groups so that there would be prevented China in supporting or interference in Myanmar internal affairs. They believe that peace would lead to national development. This peace process perhaps can also support for implementing Myanmar's democratization smoothly. Then, there is no many advantages for Chinese expectation in line with its strategic partnership particularly under the new NLD government. Indeed, Myanmar is aware of the potential dangers of being too close to China to arouse uneasiness.

However, after the New NLD government was formed in late March 2016, the State Counselor Daw Aung Sunn Su Kyi made a visit China as her first visit trip with foreign countries. Myanmar new government is determined to end ethnic conflicts. she has announced that Myanmar would hold the 21st Century Panglon Conference on August 31. Since China has the historical linkages with the multiple parties in particular ethnic armed groups, the new government hopes that China could play a mediating role in the process of

reconciliation. On the other hand, Myanmar is also keen on economic cooperation with China as well as gaining financial support from its big neighbor. Then, Myanmar's long term economic relationship with China is essential. Myanmar needs billions of dollars form foreign investment. China can be a source of investment. Nowadays, there is the planned China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which envisaged as part of China's broader Belt-Road Initiative. To gain this opportunity, Myanmar needs managing properly relations with China. The necessary reforms will also be made to promote Foreign Direct Investment as economic security will contribute to national security. If Myanmar effectively plays the relations with the economic powerhouse, China, it would gain more. Thus, it can be said that Myanmar always endeavors to keep its independence, strategic non-aligned and active foreign policy while maintains a good relationship with giant neighbor, in particular the rising China to achieve national interests.

In reality, the strategic partnership between China and Myanmar can possibly be a marriage of convenience. Myanmar's geographical position on a tri-junction among South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless economically and strategically significant. Meanwhile, Myanmar can give China a trading outlet to the Indian Ocean for its landlocked inland Yunnan province and Sichaun. Then, the oil and gas pipelines were completed between Kyaukphyu (Myanmar) and Kuming in China's Yunnan province. The gas pipeline is already in use and the oil pipeline opened in April 2017. Moreover, Myanmar is endowed with rich natural resources and a geo-strategic position between the two big giants China and India. However, since U Thein Sein came into power in 2011 until now, Sino-Myanmar relations have been showing subtle. To reduce its dependence on China, Myanmar necessarily embarked its rapprochement with the U.S. Due to the exigency of circumstances; Myanmar needed Chinese assistance but at the same time, was wary of Chinese ambivalence as demonstrated by its past attitude in the historical contest. Moreover, because of its realist diplomacy, there is growing anti-China sentiments come from Myanmar people society. Thus, Sino-Myanmar relationship can be seen as limited to the status of strictly business or marriage of convenience.

China's Appropriate or Charm Diplomacy toward Myanmar

After President U Thein Sein government took power, the changes in relations between China and Myanmar has greatly influenced on China's policy to Myanmar. To protect its strategic interests in Myanmar, China has continued to pursue its new policy or charm offensive diplomacy to Myanmar. China can make sense that its misjudgment policy has caused Myanmar people unhappiness. Therefore, standing with the military government for its national interests was not encouraged. China has become notice that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is as a key factor in implementing its strategic partnership with Myanmar after she had a landslide victory during the by-election in 2012 and the election in November 2015. China pursued its appropriate policy with NLD Party and other political parties as well as civil society organization and so on. Thus, to appease Myanmar people, China have agreed to pay some compensation for the loss of property to the local people as well as for their welfare. Moreover, China donated round about 1000 US dollar to the NLD National Health Network in April 2013. Besides, China possibly accepted that the impact of media which are lifted post 2011, has occurred increasing the anti-China sentiment in Myanmar. That has affected on the image of its government, strategic cooperation and its business people. Therefore, China has tried to interact with the NGO and the media.

Moreover, China had presented Myanmar-China Paukphaw friendship awards to 10 associations, including the Myanmar-China Friendship Association during the ceremony of Myanmar-China Paukphaw Friendship Day in Yangon in June 2018. Then, the Myanmar-China Paukphaw Friendship Fund donated Ks 80 million to Myanmar government for supporting of internally displaced persons and those affected by disasters. Thus, it can be assumed that China has tried to appease Myanmar people especially anti-China Myanmar Society in order to support its strategic cooperation in Myanmar. In general speaking, China has tried to treat the China-Myanmar relationship from a strategic and long term perspective.

Thus, China for its national interest, continues to make an effort to practice the appropriate diplomacy towards Myanmar's NLD government. It can be seen that Foreign Minister, Mr Wang Yi visited Myanmar on 6 April, 2016, and met President U Htin Kyaw and Foreign Minister, Daw Aung San

Suu Kyi to offer his praise and congratulations to the new government on their smooth democratic ascension to becoming the ruling party. During this meeting, they did not discuss any cooperation. It was because China already noticed that it cannot get any expectation about strategic partnership in relations with Myanmar like the military government age. However, for China, the charming offensive diplomacy is very important for its grand strategy: the Belt and Road Initiatives. Myanmar is a key factor in this strategy. To achieve its goals, China thus, will definitely practice its appropriate diplomacy with any successive government of Myanmar. For Myanmar, it needs to manage properly any Chinese offering opportunities for its national development.

Conclusion

The economy of China has been growing. China is the second largest economy after the U.S. On the other hand, some estimate that China is emerging a real global power and the biggest economy in the world. Moreover, it determines firmly to become a developed modern nation in 2049 and trying to get water blue navy in 2050. To achieve this aim, China is apparently striving to expand its string of pearl strategy in the Indo-Pacific. China extends its helpful hand to the countries not only Myanmar but also other countries which needs its assistance for development. Then, it is pursuing a non-aggressive foreign policy or a good neighbor policy to its neighbors. China has increasingly involved international organizations and the setting of international norms and rules too. Thus, it seems that China wants to be not only a regional great power but also a global power as its foreign relations changes.

Moreover, China has been implementing a project named the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is comprised of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt in order to develop countries and improve global connectivity. In fact, the Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on connecting China to Europe through Central Asia and Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. While the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road focuses on utilizing sea routes and Chinese coastal ports to link China with Europe via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific Ocean through the South China Sea. Kyaukphyu Sea Port (Myanmar)

involves in the BRI's key port cities. At the same time, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) includes among six international corridors of the BRI. The Economic Corridor (BCIM) is a multi-modal corridor made up of both land routes mainly via the Kolkata and Kunming (K2K) highway passing through Myanmar cities such as Mandalay and then Bangladesh through to Kolkata. Myanmar has a key strategic role in terms of energy, in maritime access to the Bay of Bengal, as a land connector to the Road and in development plans for the underdeveloped Yunnan.

Meanwhile, Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port could be taken as to avoid the Malacca Straits. Then, the Kyaukphyu Economic Zone could be a key to the Myanmar, Bangladesh and North East India Economic Corridor. Myanmar occupies an unique position in the Belt and Road Initiative. From a strategic perspective, Myanmar is one of the two direct access points to the Indian Ocean for China. Myanmar as a key BRI territorial-maritime corridor connector, has allowed China to diversity its energy import over land for its land-lock provinces Guangxi and Yunnan. Thus, Myanmar with its strategic location would be a priority country in China's Belt and Road Initiative.

In addition, China has required border security between the two countries in the supporting of the concrete implementing of the BRI project. Regarding the issue of achieving sustainable agreements between the government and the multiple ethnic armed groups (EAGS), China is the key external actor and active participating role in the Myanmar's peace process. China donated US\$ 1 million last year and an additional US \$ 1 million and 10 cars in July 2018. Then, China has created the Myanmar-China border economic zone as part of the BRI. While the Kyaukphyu deep sea port project led by CITIC – China International Trust Investment Corporation) is part of the economic corridor of China's BRI. Moreover, the two countries' currently proposed economic corridor (CMEC) will start in Chinese Yunnan Province, extend to the central Myanmar city of Mandalay, and then east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukphyu special economic zone, forming a three-pillar giant cooperation pattern. This CMEC is also part of the BRI. Therefore, the BRI engagements are currently contributing to Chinese active role in Myanmar.

To achieve successful implementation of the BRI, President Xi Jinping in March 2018, secured a path to rule indefinitely as parliament abolished

presidential term limits, handing him almost total authority to pursue a vision of transforming the nation into an economic and military superpower. Under this expectation, China would continue to practice its appropriate or charming diplomacy with Myanmar while China also maintains its friendly and strategic partnership with Myanmar in various aspects. Its grand strategy “BRI” is very important for China’s image as regional or global leadership in the world. Since it occupies a very unique position in the Belt and Road Initiative, Myanmar thus, is the strategic interests of the rising China.

Thus, it can claim that Myanmar is in the key factor of Chinese goals. For Myanmar, to response the rising China’s strategic interests namely BRI engagement, it needs to prepare well multi-level cooperation including infrastructure, electricity, industrial development and transportation and so on. As being next the rising China, Myanmar can get simultaneously not only Challenges but also opportunities from it. To tickle these events, Myanmar thus needs to know clearly about the China’s policy. On the other hand, Myanmar by playing counter balancing with the US and other countries can reduce its over dependence upon China and then Myanmar can establish interdependent relations with China. In doing so, Myanmar will certainly play its geo-strategic location and rich natural resources in particular energy, with China as an industrial country needs a huge energy from abroad. Thus, Myanmar can achieve its goals by handling skillfully in its diplomatic relations with its economic superpower house, the rising China.

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