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        <identifier>oai:meral.edu.mm:recid/00007934</identifier>
        <datestamp>2021-12-13T06:42:59Z</datestamp>
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        <setSpec>1582963674932:1597396989070</setSpec>
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          <dc:title>A Certificateless Signature Scheme to Reduce Loads on Key Generation Center</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Ei Khaing Win</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Tomoki Yoshihisa</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Yoshimasa Ishi</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Tomoya Kawakami</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Yuuichi Teranishi</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Shinji Shimojo</dc:creator>
          <dc:description>"Certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) eliminates the certificate and avoids key escrow problem.
In CLPKC, Key Generation Center (KGC) is responsible for generating partial private key and revoking a user is an

important problem. There have been some solutions to revoke users in CLPKC. Though an existing solution pro-
poses a pairing-free revocation scheme, it still requires high time key computation cost of exponentiation operations

on KGC. In this paper, we propose a revocable certificate-less signature scheme which requires less computation cost
than existing schemes. In the proposed scheme, valid users receive the time key, which is calculated using only one
exponentiation operation and some hash operations on KGC for a revocation. Under the discrete logarithm problem
assumption, we prove that the proposed scheme is secure against existential forgeability in the random oracles."</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2018-02-06</dc:date>
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          <dc:identifier>https://meral.edu.mm/records/7934</dc:identifier>
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